The economic history of Argentina presents one of the most dramatic examples of divergence in the modern era. What happened and why? This paper reviews the wide range of competing explanations in the literature and argues that, setting aside deeper social and political determinants, the various economic mechanisms in play defy the idea of a monocausal explanation.
Introduction
There is an old saying among economists, possibly apocryphal, and of unclear attribution: "throughout history there have been only four kinds of economies in the world: advanced, developing, Japan, and Argentina."
This idea can be more concretely grasped by looking at evidence on the long run levels of income per capita in a broad range of countries over the last two centuries in Figure 1 . Material living standards have advanced across the entire world, but the well--known Great Divergence is quite apparent. A few rich countries have become much richer; a larger group of poorer countries have grown more slowly average. Within each group are notable exceptions, with some very poor countries making little progress at all. However, most striking are those countries witnessing a reversal of fortune, moving from one group to the other.
The set of once--poor countries that are now rich include Japan, where the transition began more than 100 years ago, and some other East Asian countries like Korea and Taiwan, whose transition started only 50 years ago and is now almost complete. But going the other way there is only one notable case of a country that started life relatively rich and ended up comparatively poor: this is the great puzzle or paradox of Argentina. In the late nineteenth century it was among the top five countries in income per capita, richer than all European countries except Britain and on a par with other rich settler societies like the United States, Canada, and Australia. Its status among the richest economies reached a peak around 1913, when income convergence stopped. But even until 1929 it still on clung in this club, 2 only to face a slow and widening relative decline thereafter. It is now close to the average country in the world given its level of income per capita, and its citizens enjoy only 40% of the average income per capita of the 12 core countries of Western Europe.
"MicroExplanations": Trade and Investment
In a complementary chapter by Lucas Llach in this volume, written with a different focus, some important background is developed for the topics explored here. Llach discusses how the prosperity of Argentina in the circa 1913-1929 period was potentially fragile, and thus vulnerable to reversal: the pre--1914 boom had been narrowly built on the physical capital of railways and the cereal lands of the pampas they made viable, but the potential for broader growth via industrial and human capital was constrained. On wider human development measures, including schooling and health, Argentina lagged its rich country rivals, and on a regional basis its wealth was heavily concentrated in the city of Buenos Aires and its surrounding province. Such were the peculiar initial economic conditions in Argentina circa 1929.
To complement those findings, this chapter looks elsewhere, and in two different directions: it looks backwards to some of the theories of historical "deep determinants" and how they might relate to Argentina's malaise; and it steps forward to look at the evolving story after the Great Depression with these initial conditions kept in mind. I explore some of the main contours of the Argentina "macropuzzle" as the great divergence in per capita incomes emerged and then widened after 1929, and look at some of the quantitative explanations that have been advanced for it, in particular the central roles played by barriers to trade and investment.
There are many of these (and other) distortions in Argentina-perhaps too many for the tastes of economists easily seduced by monocausal explanations tied to a toy model with a minimum of parameters. But we are in a country with an untidy economic history: in economic policy terms, it is a place where almost anything that could go wrong has, at some time, actually gone wrong. In this weirdest of historical laboratories, dozens of strange economic policy experiments have been run in the last 200 years, often for long periods, and not infrequently with lasting consequences. Still, in sum, a focus on some key "microexplanations" can help us to understand a lot of what went wrong at the nexus of public policy and economic performance.
"Macropuzzles": Elusive Deep Determinants?
Yet beyond the search for immediate causes, of equal or greater concern to some economists has been the search for so--called "deep determinants" of economic outcomes, consisting of causally-and often temporally-distant factors that might be placed as primal or exogenous factors which "explain" the proximate cause and, hence, the ultimate outcome of economic underperformance. Among the most widely cited explanations are a country's geography (including land/resource endowments as well as climate/disease environment), its colonial experience, and the origins of its legal system.
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We shall review each of these explanations as applied to the Argentine case, and find that, in contrast to many other countries, most of these explanations do not fit all that well. For example: Argentina is a predominantly temperate country, it has been dominated by European settlement, it has maintained high literacy despite inequality, and its legal origins are a peculiar hybrid of common and civil law ideas.
Thus, in the debate over the causes of economic success and failure, Argentina stands as an exception to many of the rules which seem to apply elsewhere, deepening the mystery.
This contrast leaves us with the "macropuzzles": we have much work left to do in order to piece together a plausible story not only of what went wrong, but why it went wrong. What were the political economy mechanisms that derailed Argentina in the twentieth century? A century ago, despite some bumps in the road, the country was prosperous and literate, in a temperate--zone, economically open, had reasonably tolerable rule of law, and was progressing towards macroeconomic stability and a liberal constitutional democracy. It was not so unlike the other settler countries. Today, a century later, it looks very different.
The Explicandum
In the two main sections of the paper that follow we look at some commonly discussed proximate factors behind Argentina's relative economic decline. We attempt to put these factors in some kind of empirical perspective and evaluate how much they might have contributed to Argentina's economic slow down.
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To do so we will be primarily concerned with the steady state impact of such effects on output. In all cases the exact levels of these distortions have varied substantially over time, but given the slow convergence to steady state in any benchmark neoclassical model (empirically or theoretically), these factors will have a high degree of historical persistence across years and decades in any calibrated dynamic model.
With the strong forces of inertia noted, it is worth keeping in mind the kind of income gaps we have to explain. The income per person level in Argentina today (about $8,000) is about two--fifths of that in the rich world Western Europe (about $20,000). Thus we are looking for a factor, or set of factors, that when imposed on a rich country can cause income to fall by a factor of 2/5 (or drop 60%); or equivalently, factors which when removed from a poor economy could cause incomes to rise by a factor of 5/2 (or increase by 150%). Or, perhaps more cleanly, in log terms we seek to explain a change in relative income of just under 1.000 log points.
Argentine Trade in the 20 th Century
For most of the twentieth century, Argentina's trade volumes (as a fraction of GDP) have been very low, whether relative to their initial levels in the 1900-14 period, or relative to the trade levels one might predict in a similar economy of comparable size and geographic remoteness. Figure 2 traces the evolution of the trade share over time in Argentina, measured by exports plus imports divided by GDP. From a high of 80% or more on the eve of World War One, this ratio fell to levels below 20% in the 1920s and 1930s
and has remained there ever since (Berlinski 2003 Figure 3 shows what we know about average import and export taxes in the long run (Berlinski 2003) . Import taxes were not trivial prior to World War One as they were a key revenue source, but export taxes were zero.
Subsequently, in the 1920s and 1930s, average trade taxes began to climb. They abated during World War 2 and the early postwar exchange control epoch. Then import and export taxes climbed rapidly after 1960, to about a 15% level for each, or a 30% distortion total. Judging from the timing of two asymmetrical spikes in the 1980s, export taxes tended to evaporate in hyperinflation episodes, while import taxes tended to rise in an offsetting fashion, but these figures may also reflect accounting problems. In the liberalization period of the 1990s export taxes were lifted, but import taxes remained high, although trade policy become somewhat more liberal on other dimensions (e.g., quota removals for GATT/WTO compliance and an attempt to start a regional trade area, MERCOSUR). What would be the likely impact of these trade barriers on income levels? We cannot hazard a precise answer but we can use some simple impacts based on either calibrated models or econometric estimates. In this setting I will neglect the 8 standard dead--weight loss considerations since utility losses arising from static consumption and production distortions are typically an order of magnitude too small to be useful in discussions of the Great Divergence (usually 1%-2% at most). I narrow the focus further by examining the impact of trade frictions on two of the most widely discussed channels through which protectionist policies might lower incomes. (an effect analogous to a negative productivity shock) and one third would arise from the higher cost of capital goods (an effect analogous to a negative savings rate shock). These are quantitatively large effects when the full gap to be explained is 1.000 log points, since they explain one fifth of Argentina's decline. A further place to look for an impact of trade frictions on output is in the process of technology transfer. Here there are plenty of candidate theoretical models, but no consensus on the structure and calibration that best fits the data, nor is there solid statistical evidence for this channel. Accordingly let us rely on recent empirical estimates and, since the effects will turn out to be small anyway, allow ourselves to compute an upper bound for this effect. In recent work Acharya and Keller (2008) examine the impact of expanded imports from the "technology leader" country on the TFP levels in follower countries, controlling for import levels and R&D intensity in the leader, and interactions between the two. For their analysis, based on mostly developed countries, and the U.S. is the leader.
Here, we consider how the same analysis might apply to Argentina as a follower, where the OECD might serve as the R&D source. One of the upper bound results in Acharya and Keller (2008, 
Argentine Investment in the 20 th Century
A second area we might examine as an explanation for Argentina's low income is capital scarcity. By this we mean, in a standard neoclassical growth model, a suboptimal capital/labor ratio, denoted k=K/L. In the simplest model, output per worker y=Y/L is expressed as y = A k a , where A is productivity (total factor productivity or TFP) and a capital share of a=1/3 is the typical exponent used in modern empirical work (Gollin 2002) .
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The steady state of the model, at a per worker capital level k* and output level y*, can be solved by assumptions on capital accumulation, typically by either using a Solow or Ramsey growth model. In either of these models k* and y* rise endogenously in response to an increase in TFP, or A. Thus, in a "levels accounting"
exercise, a country's income level (relative to some reference country, 0) can be broken down into (1) a shortfall in TFP, that is A below A 0 ; and (2) a friction preventing k from reaching it hypothetical optimal level k*, due to investment taxes or other distortions that create a wedge and keep the marginal product of capital MPK above its optimal level MPK*. Since the production function is Cobb--Douglas, MPK=a APK is proportional to APK=Y/K; hence these deviations can be written, following Hall and Jones (1999) as:
where, by proportionality, K/Y is replaced with a/MPK, additional human capital terms are omitted for simplicity, and where the exponent in this equation is ½,
given that a=1/3. As regards the Great Divergence in incomes between rich and poor countries, and none at all after a price adjustment, and hence minor capital scarcity problems.
Mismeasurement is therefore a potentially serious issue for this calculation.
And as we can see, for most of the last three decades the story has been very different. Using data back to 1960 and the Hall--Jones PIM standardized depreciation rate of 6%, the Argentine MPK level appears to be on average 50% higher than the U.S. level, a considerable wedge. I would argue that the deviations from this pattern in the 1980s and in 2000-03 are easily understood and should be discounted: these were periods of severe economic downturn when measured installed capital is not the same as capital in use. Were it possible to further refine Argentina's measured capital input time series every year for capacity utilization levels-something no 13
statistician has yet done-we would probably discover similar gaps even in the recession periods.
Are these wedges entirely due to a factor we have already considered, the relative price of capital? If so, we must not to double count, which necessitates evaluating MPK at local rather than world prices. The chart shows that this does make a small difference. Evaluated at local prices the gap is clearly not so large, but it is still significant, and it matches up with other recent capital stock estimates using different methodologies. Perhaps from the 1960s to the 1980s slow investment was the counterpart of decelerating productivity, and Argentina could coast along with a depreciating capital base and modest net capital stock additions; but then in the 1990s the scope for TFP led growth appeared and capital was apparently not adequately mobilized. The income implications of these gaps are nontrivial. Suppose MPK in Argentina is, on average, 50% or 0.500 log points above the U.S. level as is suggested in the above estimates from the 1990s, from either the PWT or Coremberg. Then in the above expression for income differences, applying the exponent of ½, this capital accumulation friction or wedge explains 25% or 0.250 log points of the overall income difference between the two countries, and we have explained another one quarter of the Argentine puzzle.
If capital is low, and MPK is high, compared to the neoclassical benchmark, this begs the question: why has Argentina under--invested to such an extent that the marginal product of capital has found itself, so often, stuck far above reference levels? What is the nature of the investment wedge? What underlying factors cause this distortion? I cannot quantify every possible channel, but I propose several candidate explanations which center on factors that either raise the cost of capital or the risk of investment, and all may warrant further scrutiny.
First, there is the problem of risk due to macroeconomic rare events. As is well known, returns to risky investments often appear excessive given what seem like plausible models of risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott 1985) . However, the possibility of rare "crash" states or valuation jumps, which wipe out significant wealth through large capital losses, may well be sufficient to resolve this puzzle (Rietz 1988; Barro 2005 Public investments are often more dilapidated in poor countries with low quality of governance, and where large fractions of public investment spending are lost to bribery and corruption (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997) . Firm data from some countries suggests that the same may be true of private sector investments (Bu 2006) , perhaps due to private sector corruption; or due to high costs or barriers to technical maintenance; or due to capital complementarities with adversely maintained public capital, leading to premature discard or undermaintenance.
Capital is thus less productive and of lower capacity than its vintage alone would suggest and some correction for higher rates of depreciation is warranted. For example, the Hall Jones method assumes a 6% depreciation rate on all capital. But these rates may be far too low for uniform application to rich and poor countries. Bu 
Concluding Thoughts: Deep Determinants
The discussion so far of likely "microexplanations" suggests that we know, within as persuasive when applied to Argentine economic history.
Geography and Empire
To set the stage let us consider a now conventional casual ordering in the levels accounting literature. As above we claim that policies causally affect outcomes, which we might write as "policies ! income per person" in simple notation. A problem that concerns some scholars is the potential for reverse causality from incomes to policies, suggesting we look for deeper determinants that explain policies. For example: In those accounts where historical institutional choices matter (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001) , the key to a present day impact is via a political economy persistence mechanism, whereby even after independence a high level of inequality preserves colonial extractive institutions, favoring elites, and leading to high inequality in incomes and education, and persistently low levels of economic development. It now starts to become apparent why some of these theories may be poorly equipped to explain the case of Argentina. Argentina is essentially in a temperate zone, not a tropical zone, and that is especially true of the economic heart of the country-the pampas and littoral regions. Those regions are also populated by a stock of people of European descent, and they are physically and culturally separate from the country's colonial centers in the altiplano. Slavery existed, but was brief and localized. Most importantly, the country did not endure persistent underdevelopment: whatever its physical and political legacy at independence, by 1900 this was a rich country, a functioning democracy with expanding suffrage, and most importantly an economy equipped with a decent schooling system and, for its time, creditable levels of human capital (see the chapters by Llach and Campante and Glaeser for more discussion on the role of education and human capital).
Argentina resembled Canada more than Cameroon in 1900. The problem to be explained is not that the country never developed-but that it had the potential for success, at one time it lived up to it, and then found ways to fall back into underdevelopment. It is, by construction, very difficult for geographic and historical "deep determinants" to explain this kind of reversal when they rely on persistence of institutions, inequality, and economic backwardness over time. And, by way of more direct refutation, a micro--level study of the proposed inequality--based transmission mechanism raises further doubts: recent research has shown that inequality was not purely a legacy of the colonial period (Arroyo Abad 2008): in fact from 1820 to 1914, many countries saw inequality rise and fall more due to external shocks (terms of trade, migration), and the inequality at independence thus turned out to be a poor predictor of their inequality in 1914.
22 One way out of this conundrum is to keep the focus on exogenous factors, but to look either at alternative deep determinants (e.g., law) or else at the interaction of historical initial conditions with the powerful exogenous shocks coming from the rest of the global economy at key moments. I end with some speculations on these two themes.
Legal Origins
Influential work by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argues that an alternative and plausible "deep determinant" of economic success is "legal origin"-whether a country has a common law or civil code legal system. Empirically, legal origin is correlated with the colonizing power, and therefore forms part of a broader argument that among all empires the British did more good than others by transmitting better institutions to the lands they conquered (Ferguson 2003) .
Common law obtains in the Anglosphere of rich settler countries like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The civil code prevails in continental European countries and their typically much poorer former colonies. In other former British colonies, say, the poorer regions of Africa and Asia, post--independence legal structures reflect a mixed system with common law elements and some civil code structures.
Once again, for those seeking deep determinants, Argentina offers an interesting, unique, and somewhat perverse case that is not easily classified. It is commonly noted that either system, common or civil, has a tendency to become somewhat mixed over time, as jurisprudence asserts its power in civil law, and as 23 legislatures construct codes in common law systems. But Argentina was a very unusual case in that it was a mixed system from the start.
The early Argentine legal system was an outcome of a long political struggle from the period of independence (the failed Assembly of 1813 which tried to unite the provinces and establish government) until the country was finally unified Superficially, it appears that the common law features, especially judicial review and other powers, were often exercised in the 19 th century. But in the twentieth century the pendulum has swung more toward purely civil law operation, under both democracy and dictatorship-to such an extent that in the last decade the country has often called on foreign experts to assist in rebuilding some of the key functions of jurisprudence that have long lain dormant. Most legal origin evidence is cross sectional in nature, but here is an odd example of within--country time series variation. The coincidence of economic decline and the withering of Argentina's constitutional and common law traditions perhaps deserves further scrutiny for those interested in the applicability of the legal origin theory.
Potential for Trade
Lastly, one important exogenous factor that is likely to have affected the path of institutions and policies in Argentina is the global economic environment, that is, As to the second question-why the shift?-we should perhaps consider the important interaction between economic openness, vested interests, and internal political economy dynamics. For example, in a different era, it has been argued that the "shock" of Atlantic trade expansion empowered mercantile/capitalist interests in the Anglo--Saxon Northwest corner of Europe, allowing this region to embrace economic and political reforms that enhanced openness and competition in the 26 Early Modern period (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005) . In Argentina, we may have seen something of the same path dependence driven by trade shocks, only in reverse: the shock of global trade contraction discrediting and weakening the old outward--looking order, and allowing new interests to arise with more autarkic goals. Significantly, again, Argentina's extreme comparative advantage would also play into this dynamic. Just as gains from trade would be larger in Argentina than in other countries, given the peculiar factor endowment, so for the same reasons the redistributive effects of autarky would be great too (for any trade distortion, when
Harberger triangles are large, so too are the rectangles that measure redistribution of income, and thus power-see Rogowski 1989 ).
These observations fit with a broader theme in economic history which argues that economic and political competition are key complements via the forces The marginal product of capital
